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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of human resources in health is overwhelmingly acknowledged in national 
and international policy and strategy documents but much of what has been done to date to 
solve human resource problems particularly in poor and transitional countries (PTC) has 
not achieved the desired results. Health worker (HW) salaries form a major share of health 
services recurrent costs (Bach, 2000, WHR 2000) further testifying to the importance of 
human resources as an input to the health system.  
 
We now need to move from the rhetoric that people are an important resource to 
understanding reality that HWs are underpaid, poorly motivated, and increasingly 
dissatisfied in developing countries (Martinez and Martineau 1998, Bach 2000). We also 
need to understand health system factors impacting on the health workforce. These include 
macro- level factors within the health system (e.g. financing, regulation, organisation and 
management of the health system) and other socio-economic, cultural and political factors 
(e.g. economic performance and political will). Which of these factors is of greater 
importance depends on the specific context under review. 
 
The last two decades have seen reforms in the health sectors of various forms in PTC, and 
more reforms are underway. The extent to which these reforms have impacted on human 
resource capacity is not known or at least documented. What is clear is that reforms 
continue to pose significant challenges to health systems. Achievement of reform goals 
depends on the distribution of staff, the development of improved or different skills, and 
changed working practices (Martinez and Martineau 1998). It is likely that some reforms 
have created appropriate incentives for improving HW performance whilst others have had 
unintended negative effects. 
 
Human resource capacity in health remains a chronic problem even in developed 
economies such as the United Kingdom. It can be viewed from two perspectives: internal 
and external capacity. Internal capacity is related to the ability of individuals to perform 
which is linked to their knowledge, skills, and experience; whilst external capacity relates 
to the organisational, institutional and governance environment in which they are located 
(Mills et al., 2000). Thus external capacity encompasses macro-health system factors and 
wider non-health system factors such as the socio-economic and political environment. 
Internal capacity is a function of external capacity. In other words, the way the health 
system is organised and the overall socio-economic and political landscape is important to 
the achievement of internal capacity. 
 
It is therefore important to invest in developing appropriate macro- level structures and 
institutions that enhance external human resource capacity in health. This entails 
identifying the systemic constraints, designing and implementing appropriate interventions. 
The rationale for focusing on external capacity factors is that individual skills, training and 
experience is shaped by the financing, regulation, organisation and management of the 
health system. Health systems research provides an opportunity to understand why, after 
years of concerted effort in building human resource capacity in many countries, health 
workers remain demoralised and under-performing. Research that focuses on wider 
systemic and not just health service related factors might help us identify options for 
improving human resource capacity in health. The health system’s ability to improve the 
quality of services, access to these services by the poor, choice and consumer 
responsiveness centres on human resource capacity. 
 
Section 2 of the paper presents a summary of the main human resource issues raised by the 
four HSD partner countries at the Manchester workshop in October 2001. These concerns 
provide the foundation for the generic research questions presented in Section 3. Section 4 
presents a generic conceptual framework for carrying out human resource studies, using a 
systems approach. The last section of the paper considers some of the key research 
questions and data requirements for studying human resources and possible ways of 
generating and analysing the requisite data.  
 
2. Summary of country concerns on human resources in health  
 
The following are summaries of the country concerns raised at the inaugural workshop of 
the Health Systems Development programme in Manchester in October 2001. The 
summaries could be viewed as priority areas for research in human resources in the 
member countries (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Issues raised by partner countries 
Country Human Resource Issues in health 
Bangladesh · Exploring the skills mix against health system needs 
· Incentive structures for HWs and their behaviour 
· Assessment of skills mix (availability) against defined service packages at various levels 
of the service. Identification of gaps. 
· What are the training costs? 
Uganda · Uneven distribution of staff between urban and rural areas, and deployment problems  
· Problems of staff retention  
· Disparities in staff skills between the public and private sectors.  
· Use of the public sector as a training ground for private providers. 
· Training institutions: training capacity, what values and technical competencies are 
obtained from these institutions, and funding of these institutions. 
· Staff needs (capacity) versus expansion in health care infrastructure 
· Informal payments and dual practice 
· Informal and formal incentives 
South Africa · What have been the successes and failures in human resource training, deployment and 
retention in South Africa? 
· Staff distribution patterns. 
Russia · Increasing problem of over-specialisation and over-supply of specialists: appears to be 
driven by informal payments. 
· Significant investments in attempts to establish a General Practitioner Model have 
allegedly failed. Why? 
 
 
3. Key health systems  research questions in human resource studies in Health 
 
The following research questions attempt to capture all the cross-cutting themes reflected 
in the country concerns on human resources (see Table 1). 
 
1. What are the systemic determinants of incentive structures that HWs are facing in the 
four countries? 
2. How are these systemic factors influencing staff training, deployment, retention and 
performance? 
3. Does current external human resource capacity meet the needs of the health system 
(including those generated by health sector reforms)? 
4. How are health sector reforms changing incentive structures, and influencing staff 
retention and performance?  
5. How can these constraints be addressed? 
 
 
4. Conceptual Framework: descriptive and analytical linkages 
 
Health system performance is largely driven by human resources because health services 
are by nature labour- intensive. The key to understanding why health systems fail or 
succeed is arguably through understanding what motivates and drives HWs1 at all levels of 
the health system. However, understanding the determinants of HW incentive2 structures 
and their relationships is a complex process. Health worker behaviour is not only a 
function of the health system but also of the elements of external capacity such as socio-
economic, cultural and political systems, as discussed in section 1. Thus attempts to 
explore and unravel the nature of HW incentive structures and their impact on system 
performance require the delineation of an analytical framework (Figure 1). What is 
important for policy are those systemic factors that are vulnerable to change. This 
framework attempts to highlight features of the health system that impact on human 
resources, particularly those that directly or indirectly influence HW behaviour. 
 
We argue that the prevailing incentive structures faced by HWs and ultimately their 
performance are shaped by the effects of systemic factors such as financing, regulation, 
organisation and management of health systems. Incentives govern health worker 
performance in part and also training, deployment, and retention. Health worker 
performance encompasses various monetary and non-monetary elements. Overarching 
human resource policy frameworks (where they exist) are important in shaping the 
“terrain” within which these interactions occur. These issues are discussed in turn with a 
specific focus on how they relate to HW motivation and performance. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The term “health worker” is generically used in this paper to mean all cadres from the primary health care  
to the policymaking level. It includes medical and non-medical personnel. 
2 Incentive is defined as “ a thing that motivates or encourages someone to do something or a payment or 
concession to stimulate greater output or investment” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Edition, 1999). The 
WHR (2000) defines incentives as “all the rewards and punis hments that providers face as a consequence of 
the organisations in which they work, the institutions under which they operate and the specific interventions 
that they provide”. 
Figure 1: Analytical Framework for Human Resource Studies in Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Human Resource Policy in Health 
 
A human resource policy is vital in ensuring that a country’s resources are co-ordinated 
and utilised to meet the primary objective of the health system, which is to improve health. 
Effective human resource development requires that there be clear guidelines on planning3, 
training and retraining of HWs, recruitment, remuneration and deployment procedures, and 
retention. Martinez and Martineau (1996) argue that “ Human resource development 
(HRD) is concerned with the different functions involved in planning, managing and 
supporting the professional development of the health workforce within a health system, 
generally at strategic and policy levels. HRD aims at getting the right people with the right 
skills and motivation in the right place at the right time”. The functions described in these 
terms would require clarity in health system goals and the human resource needs in 
meeting those goals. The majority of health systems in PTC are undergoing reforms and 
creating new human resource demands in terms of types of HWs, numbers, distribution 
and skills mix. However, it is not uncommon for such countries to have incoherent human 
resource policies in health that do not ensure that the health system’s needs are met in a 
                                                 
3 Human resource planning refers to the process of estimating the number of persons and the kinds of 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes they need to achieve predetermined health targets and ultimately health status 
objectives (WHO, 1990). 
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sustainable way. Labour markets are not well developed such that co-ordination between 
public and private sector institutions in health worker training and deployment for example 
is important. Haphazard policies lead to either excess supply or shortages of some 
professionals in some areas and not in others (e.g., uneven HW distribution patterns 
between urban and rural areas).  
 
A coherent human resource policy in health must provide broad guidelines on how the 
activities of different types of private and public actors are financed and regulated. Bach 
(2000) argues that human resource policies can only be effective if there is agreement and 
co-ordination of all stakeholders at central level. We argue that agreement and co-
ordination must be at all levels of the health system for the policy to work effectively. 
Investments in human resource development must be driven by health system capacity 
requirements (need and absorptive capacity). The policy challenge is in ensuring that the 
activities of private and public institutions complement each other or at least engage in 
“positive” competition (e.g. based on quality). This is particularly important where labour 
markets are undeveloped. Problems of over-specialisation (and over-supply) in Russia 
seem, a priori, to be a result of lack of such a policy. The design and content of a human 
resource policy must reflect the organisation and management structure of the health 
system such that the general human resource needs for the system to function effectively 
are known. That is, what competencies, and systems of authority, accountability and career 
development are required for the system to function effectively? 
 
Issues of human resources need to be considered within the context of broad based 
developments and reforms such as demographic change, decentralisation, new partnership 
with the private sector and changes in financing of health services (Martinez and 
Martineau, 1996). In other words, we need to look beyond health service related factors in 
our efforts to understand human resource dynamics in health.  
 
4.2 Financing 
 
The level of health system financing has implications for HW training, deployment and 
retention. There are several dimensions to this. Firstly, the level of funding of public 
training institutions impacts on the scope and scale of their activities (capacity). Poorly 
funded training institutions are more likely to produce low quality products for obvious 
reasons: for instance, lack of quality teachers, facilities and other relevant training 
materials. Secondly, the way enrolees in training institutions are funded may affect the way 
they are employed, deployed and retained. Privately funded students tend to have no 
restrictions on where they practice after training. Governments tend to fund health students 
through grants, loans or a mix of both and sometimes linked to these funding arrangements 
are provisions for public employment and deployment after completion of training. In 
some instances, HWs are bonded for a given number of years in the public system. The 
success of such policies in terms of staff performance is variable. It is unclear whether 
bonding per se is sufficient to retain staff. Thirdly, it seems the greatest source of 
frustration for health workers is lack of the wherewithal to deliver quality health services. 
This is a common phenomenon in both developed and developing countries, although the 
problem is more severe in the latter. It is thus not unusual to witness highly endowed 
health systems in terms of human resources, performing poorly.  
 
Fourthly, funding levels and provider payment mechanisms have immense impact on HW 
behaviour, distribution and retention in the health system. Differences in HW emoluments 
between the public and the private sector vary across levels and countries. The sector that 
offers better salaries is more attractive to health workers. Methods of payments may also 
differ by sectors (informal, private for-profit, private not- for-profit and public) or across 
levels in the health care system. The above differences in payment methods may result in 
different configurations in incentives and HW distribution (which may vary by HW 
category). This means that the incentives that public HWs face may differ from those of 
private HWs (Xingzhu, 1999, Hongoro, 2000). Apart from HW remuneration, differences 
are also observed in working conditions and perks across these sectors. The key point here 
is that the level and method of funding the health system impacts on human resource 
training, deployment, retention, the incentive environment and ultimately performance. 
 
4.3 Organisation and management  
 
The way the health system is organised and managed impinges on HW training, 
deployment and retention. Public health systems in most developing countries often have a 
typical pyramidal health system structure with the Ministry of Health headquarters or 
Social Security organisation at the apex and primary health care facilities at the base. In-
between are various organisational levels depending on the structure and degree of 
decentralisation of the system. The management structure of the health system tends to 
follow the organisation structure. Human resource management systems (that is, training, 
supervision, concrete incentives such as remuneration (living wage, reward systems), 
promotion and performance review processes, career structures, organisational work 
culture) are linked to the organisation and management structure. The roles and 
responsibilities of the different tiers of the system must be clear. In bureaucratic systems 
health workers operate within rigid guidelines covering these processes tending to stifle 
innovation and engender laxity. The centre makes all major decisions affecting human 
resource management such as recruitment or discharge, remuneration and perks, promotion 
or demotion, training, and HW discipline. Local management is thus severely handicapped 
in that it cannot swiftly respond to local human resource needs. In decentralised health 
systems, the opposite might be true. However, in practice decentralisation is rarely 
complete as different components of human resource management are subjected to 
different levels of flexibility. Experience to date in some developing countries shows that 
de-linking civil servants from central management (e.g., Public Service Commission) is 
politically difficult (Kamwanga et al., 2000, Ssengooba et al., 2000). 
 
The rigidities associated with bureaucratic systems have a direct impact on HW behaviour 
and retention. In such systems salaries tend to be guaranteed, “high-flyers” are not 
recognised in any meaningful way because of weaknesses in the reward system, non-
performers can easily “free ride”, and working conditions are generally not conducive to 
high performance.  
 
In hierarchical systems, staff deployment is the domain of the centre and concerns over 
equity in staff distribution are common. Whilst equity is indeed a major concern, 
governments tend to ignore the implications of work location to individuals’ career 
prospects and personal development. The manner in which HW deployment is packaged 
and managed is important in any attempt to retain health workers wherever they are posted. 
 
Public health workers suffer from chronic low morale due to poor remuneration and 
working conditions. As a result they engage in different forms of income generating 
activities to supplement their low and unreliable government salaries (McPake, 1999, 
Delcheva E et al., 1997, Killingsworth et al., 1999). Opportunities for public health 
workers to engage in dual practice or informal income generating activities are facilitated 
by existing management regimes where a culture of “who cares since everyone does it” is 
dominant. Management teams are equally demoralised and therefore tend to assume a 
casual approach towards such activities. In many cases, management is equally involved in 
these activities. The problem is compounded by lack of institutional capacity to effectively 
enforce laws and regulations pertaining to professional and private practice (where they 
exist) (Konde-Lule et al., 1998, Hongoro and Kumaranayake, 2000). The biggest challenge 
facing policy makers in the health sector lies in how to tackle this “perverse” working 
culture given deficiencies in financing, regulation, organisation and management of public 
health systems.  
 
4.4 Regulation 
 
The rationale for government intervention in the health sector is to ensure that the market 
for health services meets the goals of health policy. Consumers are (relative to providers) 
ignorant about their health status and the impact health care has on their health (Jacobs 
1996). Such ignorance may lead to provider dominance, and over-servicing (or under-
servicing) of patients which in turn leads to less than optimal use of societal resources, and 
poor quality of care (which may be harmful to patients). Jacobs argues that unfettered 
health care markets may operate in the interests of (sometimes unethical and incompetent) 
providers. Thus the government attempts to regulate key players in the health care market 
including health professionals: physicians, nurses and other professional categories. 
 
There are two main reasons why health professionals are regulated. First, to ensure that 
they are adequately trained to provide quality services. Second, to ensure that, even the 
well-qualified professionals do not provide redundant care and engage in opportunistic 
behaviour. Laws and regulations are thus used to alter provider behaviour for the benefit of 
patients. The legal mechanism for assessing provider qualifications is usually through a 
credentialing process. Health practitioners are required to have appropriate credentials in 
order to provide medical care. However, regulation of the quantity and quality of health 
providers is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ensuring that the market works in 
the interest of the public. Opportunities for perverse behaviour may still exist. From a 
public interest perspective more regulations are required to control the quantity, quality 
and price of services. The rationale being that regulations create disincentives for 
opportunistic behaviour. However, it is often argued that regulations are more likely to 
work if they are a result of consultation of specific interest groups (the public, politicians, 
professionals and bureaucrats) who have a voice in what should be regulated and how it 
should be regulated-public choice theory. The behaviour and attitudes of health workers is 
likely to be different in cases where they are consulted compared to where they are not. 
 
The execution of laws and regulations is usually done by independent agencies with the 
authority of the legislature (state or federal). The regulatory agencies are responsible for 
licensing (and re- licensing) health workers to practise medicine. The process involves 
checking if potential providers meet given criteria. For example, doctors are expected to be 
medical school graduates, to have been accepted to a doctor’s association, and to have 
successfully completed an internship programme. Regulatory agencies may also be 
involved in continuous professional education (CPE), setting professional exams, 
professional discipline and inspection of health facilities and training institutions 
(Kumaranayake et al., 2000). Training institutions, just like professionals, need to meet 
defined standards before they are registered or recognised. However, in poor and 
transitional economies some training institutions operate outside the national policy 
resulting in different quality standards and focus from national policy. Regulatory 
compliance is affected by the extent to which regulatory agencies are independent.  
 
The remit of regulatory agencies varies across countries or even states. Representatives of 
professional associations, and government usually constitute boards of regulatory agencies. 
Because of limited involvement of the public and civil society in these boards, the majority 
of board members tend to be professionals themselves, which may pose high risks of 
“regulatory capture”. It is worth exploring how regulatory capture shapes the incentives of 
particular professional groups. 
 
In some cases, professional associations or councils have the mandate from government to 
license/re- license, retrain, discipline health personnel, and implement agreed codes of 
practice (professional self-regulation). Professional councils determine practice 
requirements for different professionals: that is, what they can and cannot do. This is 
commonly done within the context of overall medical practice and appropriate medico-
legal instruments. The success of self-regulation amongst health professionals in PTC 
varies. Understanding the circumstances surround ing the success or failure of professional 
self-regulation are important in comprehending health worker dynamics.  
 
Specialty certification is another form of professional licensing for those doctors who want 
to practice certain specialties. This is usually done through specialty associations, which 
set requisite board exams. Although such certification does not result in the acquisition of 
extra-privileges from those available to any licensed doctor, it increases the marketability 
of specialist physicians. This is particularly true in the USA where some hospitals expect 
such certification before deciding on whether to employ a doctor as a part-time or full-time 
employee (Jacobs, 1996). 
 
The ease with which health practitioners can establish private health care facilities or 
practise privately partly depends upon the nature of the existing regulatory framework. 
Private facilities (e.g. hospitals and equipment) might require state or federal licensing. 
Licensing entails meeting defined minimum requirements (staff, equipment, ablution 
facilities etc.,). In addition to controlling quality, regulations are sometimes used to control 
resource use or costs in the health sector. Controls could be imposed on capital expansion 
as a mechanism for ensuring that there is unnecessary duplication (or addition) of services. 
Health Systems Agencies (HAS) which were common in the USA in the early 1970s 
provide a typical example of state control on investment in health care facilities. A 
certificate of need (CON) is required before a new facility or expansion of an existing one 
is approved. Any institution that expanded without a CON was subject to legal sanctions 
(Jacobs 1996). 
 
At an individual level, private practice is generally proscribed within existing laws. Health 
providers are either licensed to do private practice or are simply required to meet defined 
educational and experience criteria before they can practice privately. The latter assumes 
that professionals are capable of self- regulation and therefore government intervention is 
unnecessary. Professional councils are expected to carry out peer reviews and random 
medical audits of its member activities as a way of controlling both the quantity and 
quality of services provided. In practice, the reality may differ from the policy. The lack of 
clarity of the laws and policies governing private practice usually breeds various forms of 
informal private practice amongst health professionals. In addition, such practices are 
nurtured by prevailing political and economic circumstances, which tend to favour strong 
professional groups at the expense of the voiceless ?  the sick and poor.  
 
The regulatory environment forms part of the macro-environment that impact on health 
worker motivation and performance. The rationale, nature and degree of enforcement of 
regulations have variable impact on human resource training, deployment and practice and 
generate different incentive regimes that drive observed provider behaviour. An 
examination of the existing regulations in different contexts might provide insights into 
provider behaviour. 
 
4.5 Health worker motivation 
 
An attempt has been made this far to show how some health system factors relate to 
HW training, deployment and retention and how this might affect provider behaviour. 
The concept of motivation in the work context is explored in this section. In order to 
do that a number of questions merit attention: “What is motivation in the context of 
work? What factors influence motivation in the work place? How does motivation 
influence performance? How can motivation problems be addressed?” Motivation is 
variously defined in the literature but the underlying themes are the same. Three 
definitions are shown here: 
 
“Motivation in the work context can be defined as an individual’s degree of willingness to exert and 
maintain an effort towards organisational goals. It is a transactional process reflecting the fit between the 
individual, the organisational context and the broader societal context” (Bennett and Franco, 1999). 
 
“ ..willingness to perform well. Work motivation exists when there is alignment between individual and 
organisational goals and when workers perceive they can carry out their tasks” (Martinez and Martineau 
1998). 
 “Motivation is concerned with whether an individual wants  to perform the task well” (Wright, 1991) or 
more narrowly and within the organisation context as “the willingness to expend effort on a particular 
task in order to attain an incentive or incentives of a certain type” (Wright, 1987) 
 
From these definitions it is clear that motivation has to do with willingness to expend 
effort towards achieving an individual goal that is consistent with that of the 
organisation or system within which the individual works. Given that complete 
alignment of individual and organisational objectives might be difficult to achieve in 
practice, what matters is the degree of alignment of these objectives. Interventions that 
attempt to increase the alignment of individual and organisational objectives are likely 
to enhance individual motivation. Bennett and Franco (1999) argue that motivation is 
an internal psychological process which is difficult to directly influence and observe. 
What can be observed are the results of the motivational process such as improved 
performance.  
 
There are several motivational theories in the literature (Handy 1993). One motivation 
theory that can allow us to answer some of the human resource questions raised earlier is 
the Expectancy Theory, first enunciated by Vroom in 1964. According to this theory, the 
level of work motivation depends on two factors: value of outcomes, and effort-output 
expectation. Value of outcomes refers to individual’s preferences to possible outcomes that 
may result from performing a specific task. These outcomes (positive or negative) can be 
intrinsic (such as sense of achievement, pride, accomplishment, guilt, and embarrassment) 
or extrinsic (such as more money, recognition, promotion etc.,)4. Effort-outcome 
expectations refer to the individual’s belief that expending a certain amount of effort 
performing a particular task will result in the expected outcome. There are two aspects to 
such expectations. First, is effort-performance expectations, that is the individual’s beliefs 
concerning the level of performance she is likely to achieve by investing a certain amount 
of effort in the task. Second, performance-outcome expectation, that is, the individual’s 
beliefs concerning the outcomes, which are likely to result from achieving that level of 
performance. According to this theory, if either of these variables is zero, then motivation 
is zero. For instance, relating staff promotion to productivity levels will not increase the 
                                                 
4 Intrinsic rewards are those derived directly from the task itself and we award ourselves depending on how 
well we feel the task was performed and extrinsic rewards are those given to individual workers by other 
people 
level of employee motivation if; (i) the employee has no interest in promotion, (ii) the 
employee believes the productivity levels set for promotion are unachievable, or (iii) the 
employee does not believe that she will actually be promoted if she achieves those set 
productivity levels. There might also be negative consequences of achieving set 
productivity levels by individuals. For example, resentment from colleagues, loss of leisure 
time and so on (Wright 1991). Employee motivation can only increase if the three 
conditions are met, and the positive outcomes outweigh the negative ones. There are other 
important factors that influence individual performance and these are summarised in Table 
2. 
 
 
Table 2: Other determinants of individual performance levels 
Goal clarity 
 
Ability 
 
Resources 
The extent to which the individual has a clear understanding of the objectives 
which he or she should be achieving in relation to the task in question 
The extent to which the individual has the knowledge and the skills required for 
the task 
The extent to which the individual has the equipment, raw materials, support 
staff, etc., required to perform the task 
Adopted from Wright (1991) 
 
 
Expectancy theory has practical limitations associated with the measurement of values, 
expectations and effort, but it provides a credible framework for analysing HW behaviour. 
It suggests that what motivates individuals is not just money, and that individual 
satisfaction depends on the level of alignment of work outcomes with individual 
aspirations. The theory is based on the assumption that human beings consciously or 
unconsciously assess their preferences and expectations in a rational manner in order to 
decide how much effort to put into a task (Wright 1991). 
 
Another motivation theory of interest in studying HW behaviour from an economic 
perspective is that of incentives. Incentive theories5 are based on the assumption that 
individuals will work hard if they are given specific rewards for their work effort. The role 
of incentives in driving individual and organisational behaviour is thus key to 
                                                 
5 The underlying assumption is that people are economically rational, can bargain and are concerned about 
work, money and conditions of service (Handy 1993). The conventional view of motivation is based on homo 
economicus, a rational human being who will make choices at the margin based on personal and financial 
gain (Crilly, 2000) 
understanding organisational dynamics and systems performance. The key question is what 
are those things that make people in an organisation work harder or not(the motivators. 
Bernard (1938) argues that “the contributions of personal efforts which constitute the 
energies of organisations are yielded by individuals because of incentives”. Incentives can 
be monetary or non-monetary as in job autonomy, status, power, authority and interesting 
work. Money is important in our thinking about causes of behaviour both because of what 
it can purchase and because of the status attached to it (Pfeiffer 1995, Handy 1993).  
 
In public systems where HWs are usually paid non-performance-related salaries, annual 
money rewards (e.g. global bonuses) may not necessarily motivate people but if high 
rewards are perceived as returns for individual effort, HWs might be motivated to work 
harder (Xingzhu 1999). A bonus system can be effective if it meets the criteria set out in 
the Expectancy Theory described above or those described by Handy below. In cases 
where HWs are not paid according to performance, non-monetary incentives (e.g. prizes, 
promotion, job enrichment, recognition, access to continuous professional education, 
workshops and loans) may be more relevant in influencing individual and group behaviour. 
For these rewards to be able to motivate people to improve performance they must be 
distributed in ways that are perceived to be related to work effort, performance must be 
measurable and attributable to the individual, the individual must expect the reward, and 
the increased performance must not become a new minimum standard for future 
assessments (Handy 1993, Pfeiffer 1995). In some scenarios (e.g., a hospital situation) 
individual performance might be difficult to measure because of “jointness” of activities 
between different staff categories (e.g. doctors and nurses) which might require complex 
reward systems (Xingzhu 1999). The behaviour of employees can be controlled by offers 
to provide and withdraw these rewards in return for compliance or defiance with respect to 
management decisions (Buchanan and Huczynski 199: pp 712.). However, political 
systems based upon rent-seeking and patronage are unlikely to support merit-based 
systems of promotion and may jeopardise the credibility of leaders (Bennett and Franco, 
1998) 
 
It is important to distinguish between those incentive structures that reduce staff turnover 
and those that motivate people to work more in an organisation. For instance, it may be 
argued that high salary, subsidised accommodation and job security may reduce turnover 
but not necessarily motivate people to perform better. This depends on the structure of the 
reward system. Furthermore different groups within an organisation or system may have 
different incentives, and therefore behave differently which might lead to sub-optimal 
performance (Harris 1977, McPake and Archard 2000). Differences in incentive structures 
might create tension within and/or between staff groups. 
 
4.6 Impact on the Health System  
 
Human resources affect the performance of the health system in a variety of ways: (i) 
equity of access to health services, (ii) quality of health services, and (iii) consumer 
responsiveness (Table 3). The categories are not completely distinct because they overlap 
in practice. For instance, consumer choice is part of consumer responsiveness, and a 
discussion of equity inherently involves differences in quality of services.  
 
Table 3: The relationship between human resource issues and system performance 
Health System Performance Links between HW and Performance 
Equity of access · Availability and distribution of different categories of HWs [urban 
versus rural, across geographical regions, public vs private] 
· Non-availability of HW may mean non-availability of particular 
services [public versus private] 
Quality of services · Availability and quality of HW in terms of training, experience, 
competencies and mix of HWs 
· HW morale and its impact on provider-patient relationship 
· Waiting times 
Consumer responsiveness · Availability and distribution of HW influences system’s 
responsiveness to consumer needs. 
· HW morale affects the interface between the system and consumers 
(or community in general) 
· Availability of HW in both the public and private sector provides 
choice for consumers 
· Feasibility of private practice, dual practice, or informal activities 
 
(i) Equity of access to health services 
 
Equity of access to services is defined here as equal access to services for equal need. 
Among the various constraints that health systems in developing countries face in relation 
to human resources, such as lack of skilled staff or low motivation and productivity, is the 
inequitable distribution of health personnel across regions. Rural and remote areas often 
suffer from under-supply of medical doctors, nurses, managers, dentists and other 
categories. On the other hand, these professionals are usually in over supply, or at least in 
higher supply in urban areas. For instance, in Cambodia 31% of HWs are based in rural 
areas, and in Angola only 15% (WHR 2000).  
 
Unequal distribution of health professionals within urban areas is also common, in 
particular areas with problems of transport or high rates of criminality are likely to be 
relatively under-served. For example the city of Sao Paulo of Brazil has a high percentage 
of health professionals overall compared to rural areas of the country, but faces large 
difficulties in maintaining health centres operational in the periphery, where crime rates are 
high.  
 
Inequities apply to HW distribution between public and private sectors and may be 
particularly acute for specia list medical practitioners. Differences in quality of HWs, 
measured in terms of skills and qualification, or motivation may also exacerbate 
urban/rural and public/private inequities. 
 
(ii) Quality of health services 
 
The availability and distribution of health workers constitutes a component of structural 
quality of services. Differences in numbers of professionals including substantial 
discrepancies in the qualifications of professionals across areas and sectors are not 
uncommon in PTC. In some countries, for example recent graduates are expected to spend 
a specified amount of time in a remote area of the country. This raises the problem of 
insufficient staff with long experience which influences the quality of care provided. 
However, because of general shortages of professional health workers in such contexts, the 
presence of a doctor may mean marked improvement in the quality of services. Lack of 
staff with specific skills, such as managerial ones, is another example. This problem may 
have been further exacerbated in countries that have implemented reform policies of 
decentralisation without human resource capacity building components.  
 
Lack of qualified health workers in the contest of growing demand for services is a source 
of frustration and demoralisation of health workers. Health worker morale and motivation 
influences the nature of health workers’ relationships with clients. Long queues and short 
consultation times result from lack of human resources (among other causes).  
 
(iii) Consumer responsiveness  
 
World Health Report (2000) defines consumer responsiveness as “..not a measure of how 
the system responds to health needs, which show up in health outcomes, but of how the 
system performs relative to non-health aspects, meeting and not meeting a population’s 
expectations of how it should be treated by providers of prevention, care or non-personal 
services.” It essentially has two parts: respect for persons which involves respect for 
persons’ dignity, confidentiality and autonomy in making choices about one’s health, and 
client orientation which involves prompt attention, quality of amenities and provider 
choice. The greater part of this definition concerns human treatment of clients or patients 
in which HW behaviour plays a fundamental role. As earlier mentioned, provider 
behaviour depends on how different components of the health system affect incentive 
structures. A demoralised health workforce is likely to contribute negatively to the health 
system’s responsiveness to consumers.  
 
Freedom to select which provider or organisation delivers one’s care is in part explained by 
availability of different providers, and in part by ability to make choices ? for example 
ability to pay. In countries where human resources are unevenly distributed, and have 
limited options for private practice, consumer choice may be limited.  
 
 
5 The Way Forward 
 
Human resource capacity in health is clearly a problem for PTC. Health systems research 
might provide approaches to finding mechanisms to redress human resource problems. We 
argue in this paper that in order to raise our awareness of provider behaviour in health we 
need to understand basic issues that relate to health worker training, deployment and 
retention. Table 4 provides a summary of broad study areas in human resources in health 
and some suggestions of possible data sources that can be used to study them. The matrix 
also attempts to highlight key questions related to different health system components. 
Understanding all the relevant systems factors and how they relate to HW behaviour 
requires a multi-disciplinary approach. The specifics of the research studies will depend on 
individual country circumstances and the nature of the problem. 
 
Table 4: Study Domains and Methods Matrix 
Study 
Domain 
Relevant Questions 
[Training/Deployment/Retention] 
Possible Data sources 
Human 
Resource 
Policy in 
Health 
(HRPH) 
- Is there a specific and clearly understood HRPH? 
- What aspects of HRD does it address?6 
- Is the human resource policy considered effective? [against the 
Mission/Goals of the health system] 
- Who are the major players in the implementation of the policy and 
what is their role? 
- Is the level of policy practice explained by its design (or content), 
implementation process or both? 
- Is the HRPH reviewed regularly? 
- NB: What is the number and mix of training institutions? Who 
determines national human resource needs? How are these needs 
established? How is the planning process? How are private sector 
activities co-ordinated? 
- Ministries of 
Health 
- Development 
Partners 
- Research 
Institutions 
- Public Serv ice 
Commissions 
- Training 
institutions (public 
and private) 
- Private employers 
- Local government 
Financing a) Training 
- What financing mechanisms are used to fund training institutions 
and individuals? 
- How much is spent on training and re-training of HWs? 
b) Deployment 
- Is there any relationship between funding policy on HW training and 
their deployment?  
- Are there incentives related to deployment? [E.g., opportunities for 
more training, promotion, location allowances and other benefits] 
c) Retention 
- How do salary levels compare between the public and private sector, 
and regionally? 
- What monetary incentives exist for public HW? 
How are these monetary incentives financed (direct budget support or 
user fees) and given (reward system—seniority or performance based)? 
- Ministry of 
Finance 
- Local government 
- Public Service 
Commissions 
- Training 
institutions (public 
and private) 
- Private Employers 
- Development 
Partners 
- Research 
Institutions 
 
                                                 
6 To include issues like planning, management & supporting professional development, financing, 
regulation, public -private mix and others] 
 
 
Study Domain Relevant Questions 
[Training/Deployment/Retention] 
Possible Data sources 
Regulation 
 
- Are there regulations that govern the activities of training 
institutions and providers of health services? Can be looked at 
two levels: 
(a) Training institutions (public/private) : Registration/licensing 
and re-licensing [accreditation processes], tuition fees, entry 
qualifications, professional curricula, validation of degrees or 
other qualifications etc. 
(b) Provider level: deployment, registration, licensing and re-
licensing, private practice (setting up private practice, dual 
practice and informal activities) 
- Who enforces these regulations and how?  
- What is the impact of enforcement of these regulations on 
professional practice and retention? 
- How is the “general public” involved in regulating provider 
behaviour? 
- Ministries of 
Health 
- Professional 
Associations 
- Regulatory 
Agencies 
- Public Service 
Commission 
- HWs 
- Local government 
- Private employers 
Health system 
Organisation & 
Management 
- How is the health system organised and managed? [level of 
bureaucracy and decentralisation] 
- Do managers at different levels of the health system manage 
their staff in a way that recognises their role in implementing 
the HRPH? 
- How does the existing health system organisation and 
management structure impact on: 
- Training and retraining of HW 
- HW deployment  
- Supervision, lines of authority and accountability 
- HW discipline 
- Career structures, promotion and performance review processes 
- Reward systems 
- Organisational culture/working environment  
- Opportunities for private practice and informal activities 
 
- Ministry of Health: 
(state/federal) 
- Professional 
Associations 
- Public Service 
Commissions 
- Private employers 
(for-and not-for-
profit) 
- HWs 
 
Health Worker 
Motivation 
(Incentives) 
- What are the main factors influencing health worker 
behaviour? 
- What are the perceptions of HW regarding: 
a) Training: financing arrangements, regulations, and organisation 
and management of human resources 
b) Deployment: policies, strategies, and related incentives 
c) Retention: financing (monetary and non-monetary incentives), 
regulation (professional practice and opportunities for private practice), 
organisation and management (working environment, career structures, 
promotion and performance assessment systems, reward systems, training 
opportunities, etc.,) 
 
 
 
Study Domain Relevant Questions 
[Training/Deployment/Retention] 
System Implications: 
· Quality See Table 3  
· Equity of 
access 
See Table 3 
· Consumer 
responsiveness 
See Table 3 
 
 
Throughout the analyses depicted in Table 4, attempts should be made to document what 
human resource strategies and/or policies have been successful in the study countries and 
the reasons for success. A similar analysis for failures would be equally beneficial. 
 
 
Priority Areas for Research in 2002-2004 
 
From the discussion above it is clear that here are many aspects of human resources in 
health that require investigation. Table 5 is a summary of the priority research areas that 
are likely to add to existing evidence and knowledge on human resource dynamics in 
health in PTC. Underlying this research agenda is the recurring theme of health worker 
incentives and behaviour. 
 
a) Impact of reforms on health workers  
 
In the last two decades developing country governments have implemented a variety of 
reforms in the health sector with the hope of creating the right individual and institutional 
incentives for improving system performance. However, reforms have not always been 
initiated with due consideration of human resource issues that are relevant to their success. 
This has often led to inefficiencies, reduced responsiveness and unattained targets (WHO, 
2000). Research into why and how well intended reforms have failed to achieve set 
objectives will inform future reforms. Of particular interest, is how reforms have reshaped 
health worker incentives and hence affected performance. 
 
b) Private practice among Midwives 
 
The programme intends to work in collaboration with other institutions on how private 
practice, particularly among publicly employed midwives has impacted on public services: 
access (especially for the poor), costs and quality of health services. Included in the study 
will be an analysis of: the nature and magnitude of private practice, the regulatory 
environment, the incentive structures and the characteristics of providers. The study will 
provide an opportunity to explore issues related to the public-private interface, the role of 
government, human resources and incentives, access and quality of services, which are part 
of the health systems development programmes’ objectives.  
Table 5: Selected priority areas for research in human resources (2002-2004)  
Research Proposal Research Objectives/Questions Methods Expected Results 
1) Impact of Health 
Sector Reforms on 
human resources in 
health 
1.1 To critically analyse health sector reforms in relation to the macro-
level environment fo r the health sector  
1.2 To examine the impact of reforms (decentralisation, user fees, 
regulation) on the incentive environment for health workers  
1.3 To explore the impact of changes in the incentive structures due to 
reforms (decentralisation, user fees and regulation) on staff 
performance  
1.4 To assess how decentralisation, user fees and regulation changes 
impacted on human resource capacity  
1.5 To make policy recommendations on how to improve health 
systems performance through human resource capacity 
development. 
· Review of policy/reform documents on 
human issues  
· Stakeholder analysis  
· Health Worker interviews using 
structured questionnaires 
· Inventory of human resources. Map the 
drifting of human resources in the 
health system over time (by sector and 
location)?  use h ealth worker 
concentration maps (GIS or EPIMAP) 
 
· A macro-level analysis of 
health sector reforms and 
their impact on health 
worker incentives  
· An analytical review and 
synthesis of changes in 
incentives and motivation 
· A comprehensive 
assessment of the impact 
of HSR on Human 
Resource Capacity 
2) Dual practice 
amongst public 
midwives: its 
nature, magnitude 
and impact on 
public services  
[Collaborative research  
2.1 Review the existing public policy and regulatory framework 
concerning midwifery practice. 
2.2 To determine and establish the magnitude of different forms of 
private practice amongst public midwives. 
2.3 To establish the characteristics of midwives and their incentive 
structures. 
2.4  To identify and evaluate the consequences of private practice 
by public midwives on public services: access (especially for 
the poor), costs and quality of health services 
· Policy level analysis: review existing 
policies and regulations, stakeholder 
analysis  
· In-depth interviews with public 
midwives using a structured 
questionnaire 
· Interviews with users and non-users 
using a structured questionnaire 
(include wealth variables) 
· Estimation of Opportunity Cost of 
private practice by midwives  
· A detailed description of 
the policy and regulatory 
framework 
· Characteristics of 
midwives involved in 
private practice 
· Characteristics of users 
and non-users (including 
wealth/socio-economic 
rankings) 
· Cost to the public sector 
of private practice by 
midwives 
3) Labour markets in 
health in three countries 
(PTC): what works and 
what does not? 
3.1 What are the characteristics of labour markets in health in PTC?  
3.2 To analyse demand and supply side analysis of labour in health?  
3.3 What are the causes of labour market failure/success in such 
contexts? 
3.4 What are the implications for government involvement in labour 
markets in health?  
· Review of relevant documents and 
interviews with human resource experts 
in the sector using a structured 
questionnaire 
· Supply-side or demand side 
models/function ???? to discuss with 
Prof Normand 
· Market structure: 
characteristics of 
suppliers and demanders 
· Labour marker 
performance 
measurement???? 
4) Social elements of 
health worker incentives 
??? 
4.1 To apply the Expectancy Theory Framework in understanding 
health worker incentives and worker behaviour 
4.2 To assess how non-monetary incentives (e.g. work culture, self-
concept) affect behaviour. The hypothesis being that, ceteris 
paribus, health worker behaviour is influenced as much by non-
monetary incentives as by monetary incentives. 
  
 
 
c) Analysis of labour markets 
 
d) Social aspects of health worker incentives 
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